Presenters:  Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, Former NATO Secretary-General; General Tod Wolters, Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow For Peace, Security And Defence And Former Deputy Assistant Secretary General For Emerging Security Challenges At NATO

November 23, 2020

Friends Of Europe Seminar On Redefining Defense In An Age Of Disruption

            JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER:   Thank you so much, Jamie. 

            And thank you, General Wolters, the SACEUR, to have found the time to enter into -- into our conversation.  A warm welcome to you, General. 

            The general and I have had a (pre-conversation ?), we have half an hour for our conversation.   And we both will take three or four minutes to kick off this theme in this half hour. 

            And given the fact that I ended my military service as just a second (lieutenant ?), I have the great respect for four-star generals, certainly U.S. generals.  And we have decided that General Wolters would kick off, and then we'll see where the discussion flow will lead us. 

            General Wolters, great pleasure.  Over to you. 

            GENERAL TOD WOLTERS:   Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  It is really good to hear your voice and see your face.  And also, for the last several minutes, to see Jamie Shea, his voice, and look at how wonderful he looks.  It feels like a good old-fashioned NATO headquarters meeting up at Brussels, so my -- my first of all opening is, thanks so much for the opportunity to spend some time with you. 

            I would like to comment on -- on two major accomplishments in the near term with respect to NATO.  And the first is North Macedonia at 30.  And as we all know, to bring one more nation in who shares our incredible value system, dramatically increases NATO's solidarity.  And that has certainly been the case with North Macedonia. 

            I'm also pleased to report, Mr. Secretary, we made some palpable gains with respect to NATO command structure adaptation.  We're on the cusp of getting Joint Force Command-Norfolk, located on the East Coast of the United States, up to full operational capability, and we're very, very close to Joint Support Enabling Command to do the same. 

            And both of those will increase our ability to extend freedom all the way across the Atlantic, and when we have to generate more peace on the European continent, with a great logistics command like Joint Support Enabling Command, we will dramatically improve our posture in that arena. 

            I'm excited about what's taken place, and I'm really excited about the future.  And I look forward to sharing some of those thoughts with you, Mr. Secretary.  Over to you. 

            MR. SCHEFFER:   Thank you so much, General, for this introduction. 

            Let me add, trying to take a political -- political angle, that I think when we discuss security more in general -- and I'm looking at the same time at the incoming U.S. administration -- I think the biggest challenge for -- not only for the U.S. but for all of us, and that includes of course the European Union and NATO, will be (balancing ?) China.  

            Balancing China will lead to questions about the partnerships the United States has entered into, questions about NATO.  Let me give you an example, and I know that the Secretary General Stoltenberg is working on it.  Does NATO have a China policy?  

            The discussions have started in NATO, but to make it more concrete, is freedom of navigation in the South and East China Seas, is that an exclusive United States responsibility?   Or would it be a more responsibility of the west?  

            And then I define the west broader than us here in Europe or NATO and the European Union.  I think about partners in the west as well like Australia, Japan, South Korea, potentially India and so on and so forth. 

            Those questions will also be focused on burden-sharing in (general ?), burden-sharing in the financial sense of the word.  We are not doing well in Europe, we are doing deplorably bad.  (Yeah ?), the percentages go up now because GDP is going down as a consequence of COVID, so in financial burden-sharing, there is still an awful lot to do, although more money has been coming in. 

            But the example I gave on NATO and the South and East China Seas, it's also political burden-sharing.   And that's relevant for the European Union as well, where the question will come from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, "What is your (weight ?) in our partnership?  We're all for partnership, what is your (weight ?), European friends?  Do you have a China policy which goes beyond exporting cars, in a slight exaggeration."

            So in brief, there are a lot of questions which will come from the other side of the ocean to us, questions we have for the -- for the Americans, questions for NATO and questions for the European Union.  

            General, over to you. 

            GEN. WOLTERS:   Thanks, Mr. Secretary. 

            As you well know, there is value in autonomy.  It forces large organizations to take full accountability for their actions.  And as you well know, when we take a look at some of the large organizations that have the ability to contribute to generating peace inside of Europe and outside of Europe, one can quickly look in all domains -- to include whole-of-government, (whole-of-nation ?) at the E.U and at NATO. 

            And as a military member -- and as you practice as the secretary general, one of the things that we absolutely, positively must do is -- is make the most productive use on the investments, whether the investments are small or large. 

            And I will say, we have had six straight years of increased percentage of investments by our NATO allies, and it has -- it has graduated into well over 100 million -- 100 billion non-U.S. dollars since 2016. 

            And as a military member, I'm able to look at the environment and find ways to increase our strategic alignment and transparency, so when we look at, for example, all of the activities of the E.U. and all the activities of NATO, you would want to make sure that through the military dimension and outside of the military dimension, we have the best strategic alignment and transparency possible. 

            And one of the things that we've been able to produce in the NATO military domain is a strategy -- the first we've seen in over six and a half decades, a NATO military strategy, and subsequently a concept for the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and soon to be a SACEUR (A.O. ?) worldwide strategic plan that references what we do in the military domain. 

            And at the end of the day, these plans will allow nations to craft their national military plans to be more focused on what it is they can and can't do to enhance that strategic transparency and alignment. 

            And we've actually been without that clear direction and guidance for several decades, and this puts us in a step to where ultimately nations can look at requirements in the military domain and be more suited to adjust to the environment to help deliver peace on the European continent than we have in the past. 

            And as long as we continue to work very, very hard at the secretary general level -- which as you well know, Secretary General Stoltenberg does -- that strategic transparency and alignment that exists between E.U. and NATO can be very, very palpable, and really assist us in generating more peace -- and we are doing that. 

            And when it's all said and done, it makes NATO at 30 far greater of an alliance with far greater trust and far greater ability to keep folks who continue to demonstrate malign influence -- for example China -- outside of European borders as well as inside of European borders at bay.  And I think that serves a great purpose to ultimately generate more peace from a global perspective as well as a regional perspective. 

            MR. SCHEFFER:  Let me -- General, thank you.  Let me pick up the points -- the points you made also on -- on Europe.  Strategic autonomy.  I must say, I'm not a big fan of the word, because when you launch such a slogan, you should be very serious to achieve it.  

            And I also know from American friends that in the United States of America, people prefer the word "strategic power" over "strategic autonomy" because autonomy might lead to the conclusion that somebody would like to go it all by himself or herself. 

            But anyway, apart from the definition of "strategic autonomy," what I would like to add here is that strategic autonomy and the European Union, where are we after Brexit?   Where are we after Brexit?  What is Europe militarily after Brexit?  That is -- with a slight exaggeration -- that is France.  Because Germany, of course, is extremely important but Germany is not -- for reasons we all understand -- at the forefront when it concerns the (heart ?) of military power.  And I say, again, I fully understand that. 

            So what we need to do in Europe -- and that is, I think, a notion important for the European Union but for NATO as well by the way, is see how we can, after Brexit, get the United Kingdom as closely linked as possible to what's happening inside the European Union in the realm of defense. 

            And that's why, with another hat on and in another capacity, I have, with a group of Dutch colleagues, proposed that we should have, in Europe, in Brussels a very informal institution -- I underline, very informal -- the European Security Council, which builds on ideas voiced by Chancellor Merkel and President Macron.

            But an informal body consisting of France, Germany and the U.K.  And then we add on the secretary general of NATO and the chairman of the European Council.  So that in time of a crisis, there is a start for the division of labor.  Who's going to act?  Is it the European Union, is it NATO, is it a combination of the two, is it a coalition of the willing? 

            So that for me is an important element in trying to fill out or fill in that notion of strategic autonomy without harming NATO -- of course without harming NATO -- and adding beef to what the European Union can bring to bear in crises where we, as Europeans, cannot always ring the doorbell of the Oval Office. 

            Think about the (Sahelian ?) zone in Africa.  When there's a crisis erupting there -- some people say that might be, let's hope not for heaven's sake, that might be Europe's Afghanistan -- when there's a major crisis in the Sahel and France is in Mali and the U.N. are in Mali, then we cannot go to -- to the U.S. president and say, "Mr. President, could you please help us out?"  So Europe needs strategic autonomy -- all right, I'll accept the word -- but most -- and foremost, also strategic power.  

            And then I come back to you, General, because more European strategic power -- as you just said a moment ago -- is very much in the interests of NATO, and very much in the interest of your responsibilities as the Supreme Allied Commander.

            GEN. WOLTERS:  Mr. Secretary, I couldn't agree with you more with respect to the -- to the phrase "strategic autonomy."  I also prefer something more along the lines of "strategic power."

            With respect to the discussion on the architecture (above ?) the NATO level, I'll let you delve in that area, but I will tell you that your proposal is very sane and it makes sense in any efforts to take strategic organizations and improve their alliance and transparency is obviously a step in the correct direction. 

            One of the things that we're very concerned about are these issues of military requirements.   And you mentioned recently the United Kingdom.  And as you well know, just 3.5 days ago, the United Kingdom was able to produce a very sound budget that was very, very serious with respect to defense spending, and we're all very, very excited about this. 

            And the items that the U.K. plans to devote their energies and monies to are very well aligned with the overall strategic alignment and transparency of what we need in Europe to better generate peace. 

            As you're well aware, secretary general, they're focused on -- on comprehensive defense and shared response.  They take a very, very global view at what takes place with respect to nation-states who are nefarious, as well as international terror groups.  

            And this is a prime example of a nation who's established a military plan and supported it with a budget who is targeting requirements that ultimately tie into our strategic alignment to allow us to generate more peace. 

            What I owe the architecture, just below the levels that you started with, are what it is that we need to be successful with respect to keeping the peace within Europe.  And the areas that we've focused on are those that improve our speed in every category, and those that improve our posture in every category.  

            And if we can find one way to move one (pallet ?) at greater pace by at least one kilometer per second from the United Kingdom to Poland, that's a gain because it could be that very, very one second that is the difference between an individual receiving PPE for COVID protection or not.  So speed applies in all domains and it applies in all regions and it certainly applies whole of government, whole of nation.

            And as we continue to press forward together with this better strategic alignment and transparency, all the way down to the -- to the young level within our militaries, we can apply speed and posture and be in a position to where we can help generate greater peace, and I -- I certainly see that taking place.

            And in my short time here as -- as SACEUR for the last year and a half, I -- I have had multiple dealings with the Military Committee of the EU and multiple discussions with the Chairman of the Military Committee of the EU, Claudio Graziano, about these very subjects, and each and every one of those transactions affords us the opportunity to learn more and more about what our capabilities are to ensure that we don't unnecessary duplicate what we are doing in the military domain and find ways to be as effective as we can at the strategic level when dealing with speed and posture.

            MR. SCHEFFER:   Thank -- thank you, General.  I -- I -- I think -- I think what -- what -- what you say is -- is -- is on the mark.  We -- we have to adapt to a new environment, we have to adapt -- we, in Europe, but that also goes for NATO and the European Union -- toward -- I -- I do consider and I think I can be as audacious to -- to expect that the U.S. President will -- will -- will agree with me, I -- I -- I think how are we going to -- to fill in what is asked of us, be it NATO, be it -- be it the European Union, of -- of balancing China.

            And then I'm not only talking about politics, not only talking about trade -- I mentioned freedom of navigation already -- but I would also add the whole relationship in the sphere of technology, be it artificial intelligence, be it biotechnology, be it quantum computing -- where we have to -- to be able to match what is happening on the -- on the other side of the world.

            Do -- do not forget that's another element I would like to bring in from a political angle, that President Xi Jinping in -- in -- in China clearly stated, and I almost literally quote him now, "our system is superior."  So there is all -- also a value element in that -- in that relationship, an ideological element, if you wish, as we had that with the Soviet Union during -- during the Cold War.  There's a human rights dimension, which is, I think, for the European Union, a big challenge to define a China policy and to ask -- to answer the question coming from the United States of America, President-elect Biden.

            I'm -- I'm -- I'm all in for partnerships, for restoring partnerships, I'm all in for alliances but dear friends in Europe and in that broader definition of the west I was depicting a moment earlier, what is your gravitas, what -- what -- what is your participation in those partnerships on -- on -- on all of those issues?

            And I think that that is a challenge for NATO, on top, General, of the challenges you have in NATO, what I would qualify as -- as the traditional challenge of -- of seeing that your enhanced forward presence is -- is -- is alright on the eastern flank of -- of NATO and that the instability around the NATO area is getting the -- the attention it needs, be it the Black Sea, be it, as you quite rightly mentioned, General, the Western Balkans, where I hope very much, with you, that north Macedonia will have a chance of -- of -- of becoming a -- a member of NATO within -- within the foreseeable future.

            As you know, that is, again, rather problematic in the European Union because there is a nation which -- which doesn't like northern -- north Macedonia very much.  Anyway, lots of -- of political, military challenges and -- and -- and also the interchange between those political challenges, military challenges, and I add again, tech challenges, because why are we so much struggling on 5G and Huawei?  That is because we, as Europeans, have forgotten to -- to substantially invest over the past decade in systems so that we could match Huawei.

            Anyway, I'll -- I'll stop here, General, because for the moment, I think that is more than enough.   Over to you.

            GEN. WOLTERS:  Secretary, much -- much of what you addressed had to do with maligned influence on behalf of China globally, and -- and -- and we see that in the form of violating our sovereign domains and territories.

            And -- and -- and certainly in the South China Sea, in the Spratlys, that has been an issue, and as we take a look at air, land, sea, space, cyber and SOF, we -- we -- we certainly have many examples that -- that we can put on the table that specifically address maligned influence on behalf of China.

            And as you well know, Mr. Secretary, Secretary General Stoltenberg has been keen to point out NATO's strength and its willingness to -- to take a -- a (Pacific ?) focus, to -- to make sure that we can do all within our capability to -- to -- to shore up our ability to achieve peace within Europe and obviously outside of those boundaries.

            And -- and one of the things that we have to do is -- is in -- continue to increase our -- our vigilance in those areas of activities of maligned influence below the actual level of kinetic conflict, and -- and we've been very keen to watch that.

            And when we see a -- an actor inside of Europe that -- that has a history of maligned influence from an informational domain perspective, we -- we, number one, have to have the appropriate indications and warnings to identify that is taking place, and number two, have the appropriate command and control to be able to communicate with one another to -- to -- to diminish that maligned influence.

            And the Huawei 5G is a classic example of -- of the goodness of -- of the alliance over the course of the last eight months.  As we're all very, very familiar with, we've seen a proliferation of Huawei in Europe and several nations, and certainly over the course of the last 90 to 120 days, we've seen Huawei go in different directions outside of Europe as a result of those nations not willing to communicate or work with Huawei in the 5G sector, and we've seen an increase inside of Europe for NATO's appetites and the EU's appetites to jump on to a -- to a 5G contractor, and -- and that, too, will improve our -- our speed and posture with respect to all of the attributes that I talked about before.

            So in -- in short, we -- we do want to ensure that we have the ability to have the indications and warnings that project outside of our European boundaries to see if we have maligned influence that could ultimately impact what takes place inside of our European nations.

            And I'm proud to report, for the last year, we've -- we've certainly improved in that area.   It's comprehensive defense and shared response with the nations, understanding what happens in the air, land, sea, space, cyber and SOF, and making sure that if we detect or see violations of -- of our sovereign domains, of our sovereign territory, we -- we have the strength and the ability to respond, and we have and that continues to improve and -- and that's great NATO solidarity.

            MR. SCHEFFER:   Thank you -- thank you, General.   I -- I think we're nearing the -- the end of our -- of our very interesting conversation.  Let me -- let me -- let me add a few words.  NATO is -- has to be and will always be an -- an alliance which, if necessary, can -- can project hard power.  So NATO is, I think, up to what I would qualify as a hard-power environment globally and certainly as far as the (terms ?) are concerned. 

            What I would like to see -- and I think that is really in the interest of NATO -- is that the European Union, which was not built as a hard-power union but as a soft-power union -- for good reasons, by the way -- and that's why I like "strategic power" more than "strategic autonomy."

            That European Union will develop -- and as far as I'm concerned that can happen under French-German leadership because those are the two nations, and you may like or dislike President Macron, he has ideas of European intervention initiatives and what have you, he has ideas about the future of Europe. 

            That under that leadership of France and Germany and including -- as I said in this -- in this European Security Council -- including the U.K., Europe at a certain stage -- rather sooner than later in my opinion -- should be a union which is also able to project hard power when in its own environment the need might arise to project hard power.  

            And then I'm not of course talking about Article 5 and Article 4 situations in NATO, that will always be exclusively NATO.  But I mentioned the Sahelian zone, where I think there might at least be a discussion if and when necessary, who would -- who would and who might act. 

            General, I give you the final -- final word, but let me say that it was a great pleasure to have the opportunity to have this conversation with you.  Over to you, General. 

            GEN. WOLTERS:  Thanks, Mr. Secretary, it's a thrill to get to see you again and be able to spend some time with you.  

            I must tell you, as much as I think you and I dislike the phrase "strategic autonomy," I think you and I really like the term "hard power."  And I couldn't agree with you more with respect to your characterization of where NATO is and its ability to assist in that area. 

            And I will also tell you, as you well know from all of your experience and all of your time as our secretary general, in my hat as SACEUR, in my hat as the EUCOM commander, from a U.S. military perspective and from a European military perspective, the opportunities that I've had to work side by side with my French counterparts and my German counterparts, the relationship has never been stronger.  

            The growth in capability of mission sets inside of those militaries has never tried any harder to improve, and I feel like our campaign momentum with respect to our ability get better each and every day is dramatically improving over time.  That's what you would expect out of those militaries, and my promise to you, Mr. Secretary, is it still exists today just as it did in your time, and it's just absolutely wonderful to see. 

            One of the things I'd like to close with is, our ability to generate peace in all domains and all regions from a comprehensive perspective, in competition to crisis in conflict is -- is growing with each and every passing second.  And that's what we need to continue to do in those areas. 

            The nations are focused on the concept for the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and they're finding ways to improve our indications and warnings to see the environment, they're finding ways to improve our command and control and they're finding ways to improve our mission command, which is finding a way to get better from a readiness perspective with respect to resilience and respect to responsiveness.  And the nations are doing a wonderful job. 

            Mr. Secretary, it was great to be with you, it was great to see Jamie and I'm really excited about the future discussion topics that are coming up in cyber and space, and I think those are areas that we need to continue to cultivate to ensure that we can be more comprehensive in our ability to generate peace in Europe. 

            Thank you, Mr. Secretary, great seeing you. 

            MR. SCHEFFER:   Thank you, General.  

            And we over -- back to Jamie, my trusted n in my -- in my NATO days and years.  Over to you, Jamie. 

            And thanks, General, bye-bye. 

            JAMIE SHEA:  Boy, Secretary General, (always ?), yeah, thank you so much for leading that strategic conversation. 

            General Wolters, the SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, thank you so much for giving us your time. 

            And thank you to both of you for the very open, frank and far-reaching discussion that you had there.   We spent the first hour looking very much at European power applied to internal resilience issues, and applied to the neighborhood.  

            But both of you usefully reminded us that there's a big world out there and it's not always a very cooperative or very peaceful world, and if European power is going to mean anything, it's going to be also the ability to contribute to stability in the wider world. 

            (inaudible) (hour ?), (inaudible) institutions, you both sort of pointed out this great power (lock ?), and it's at the moment when the challenges are the greatest, we need, on both sides of the Atlantic, the institutions of government to step up in their willingness to work together and engage with each other, but also challenge each other.  And hopefully we're going to see that in the years ahead. 

            So again, that was an excellent strategic conversation, it really was the best complement that we could have had to the earlier discussion and thank you to both of you for your intellectual input there. 

            That wraps it up then, ladies and gentlemen, as far as this segment of the security summit is concerned.  But as Jaap pointed out and the SACEUR pointed out, we do have tomorrow, (cyber ?) and artificial intelligence, we do have space coming up on Wednesday.  So look forward to seeing you back here very, very soon indeed.  

            But in the meantime, again, thank you for joining us today and have a pleasant evening, stay safe and please be back here tomorrow.  Bye for now.

            -END-