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APPROVED BY: _____

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African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Concept

1. **SUMMARY.** This paper highlights development and current status of the ACRI concept.

2. **BACKGROUND:**

a. **Concept.** Enhance existing capabilities of African militaries to enable their greater and more effective participation in limited humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Africa. Focus is on provision of limited equipment and unit level training of 10-12 infantry battalions and 4-6 specialized companies. Training events will improve existing peacekeeping skills, strengthen logistics and service organizations, and create African headquarters capabilities. The U.S. and other international donors will support pre-deployment planning, training, supplemental equipment, and long term sustainment.

b. **Mission.** ACRI trained forces could conduct limited HUMRO operations to provide a *more secure environment* for either refugees or internally displaced people and to facilitate the wholesale delivery of humanitarian aid, in order to minimize human suffering and deter violence or participate in limited (Chapter VI) PKO. Notional ACRI mission statements:

(1) HUMRO. When offered, ACRI trained forces conduct operations to provide a more secure environment for either refugees or internally displaced people and facilitate the wholesale delivery of humanitarian aid, in order to minimize human suffering and deter violence.

(2) PKO. When offered, ACRI trained forces conduct operations designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of a negotiated peace agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

c. **Execution.** USEUCOM is the Executive Agent for development of the military aspects involved in establishing the concept. USCENTCOM, SOCOM, ACOM, and TRANSCOM are designated as supporting CINCs.

d. **Relationship to EUCOM and National Military Strategy:** ACRI is fully compatible with both the EUCOM and National Military Strategy.

1. NMS Promote Peace and Stability: Enhancing PKO/HUMRO capabilities within Africa directly supports the NMS objective of promoting peace and stability.

2. EUCOM Promote Stability, Democratization, and Military Professionalism in Africa: The training conducted leads to an apolitical, professional military that respects human rights.

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3. EUCOM Provide Prompt Response to Humanitarian Crisis: Enhancing African capabilities to conduct PKO/HUMRO missions provides additional options for U.S. response. The country knowledge gained, and relationships developed, will be invaluable if we ever are required to respond to a humanitarian crisis in Africa or elsewhere.

e. **Constraints:** Only countries with professional military units which meet the following standards: acceptance of democratic civilian authority; respect for human rights; participation in prior peacekeeping operations or a demonstrated interest in engaging in peacekeeping activities; and a relatively high level of basic military proficiency, are able to receive ACRI training.

f. **Relation to OAU and UN.** ACRI is careful to coordinate with the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Governments with ACRI trained units could deploy their forces in peacekeeping or humanitarian operations conducted by the OAU, UN, subregional African organization, or a multinational force coalition. Such operations should have approval from the UN Security Council. The UNDPKO was briefed and approves the overall concept to improve existing African capabilities. However, UNDPKO is not manned nor financed to conduct ACRI development, nor will it control international bilateral training initiatives, such as ACRI..

g. **International Support.** Interagency deployed pol-mil teams to Europe seeking support for the ACRI. The teams traveled to the Netherlands, UK, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. While there is a general consensus on the concept's viability, there are numerous questions concerning the establishment, training, equipping, and employment of the force. Several Allied nations recommended that the U.S. concept be closely coordinated with French efforts. (EUCOM regularly coordinates ACRI concepts with the French). The French have developed their own version of the ACRI, called "The Reenhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity." They key is that the French, British, and American programs are complementary and coordinated.

h. **P3/Tripartite Agreement:** On 22 May 97, the U.S., Britain and France agreed in principle to identify a mechanism to coordinate peacekeeping training programs and work together in promoting a joint initiative to strengthen the capacity of African countries to participate in peacekeeping under OAU and UN auspices. The agreement recognizes that each country has separate peacekeeping programs with many states in Africa and that there are advantages to be derived from a more coordinated approach. An attempt to replace competition with cooperation. The joint initiative is based on four principles: long term capacity enhancement, legitimacy, openness, and transparency. P3 has a political and military level. EUCOM is working with the British, French and numerous other militaries to coordinate our efforts in Africa. In a world of declining resources, we must ensure our efforts complement each other.

i. **African Support.** Interagency deployed pol-mil teams to Africa and engaged African representatives to the UN. To date, Ethiopia has offered two infantry battalions; Uganda,

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Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Malawi offered one battalion each. USEUCOM pilot (assessment) teams traveled to Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, Mali, and Ghana and reported that, at the battalion level, these forces are capable of participating in operations with minimal training and equipment. The pilot teams recommended training designed to improve basic peacekeeping soldier and junior leader skills and development of battalion and brigade staffs capable of conducting multi-echelon, multinational (regional) operations. Momentum for the program continues to build as numerous other African nations search for their role in the ACRI or other PKO training concepts. We are also working to integrate African trainers into the ACRI program. During the Malawi FTX, Malawi officers provided evaluators during the FTX phase which added a different and useful perspective.

j. **Equipment/Training.** The United States is providing limited equipment, approximately \$1.2M per African participant for equipment purchase. This money will buy and ship command and control equipment (Motorola hand-held radios, spare batteries, repeaters, battery chargers, and generators), training ammunition, individual soldier equipment (uniform, boots, load bearing equipment), and peacekeeping support equipment (water purification equipment, night vision equipment, and flood lights). Maintenance training is integrated throughout both initial and sustainment training. The service support tasks listed in the ACRI POI cover most logistics subjects. Maintenance training is provided for both ACRI issued equipment and organic unit equipment. 3SFG normally augments their training team with logistic subject matter experts from USAEUR to assist them in training African maintenance skills. The focus is on teaching operator level maintenance and the maintenance management skills necessary to develop and run a good maintenance program. Although operator and some direct support maintenance is taught; only limited general support or detailed troubleshooting is included in either initial or sustainment training. Contractor support is available for ACRI issued equipment that is still under warranty.

k. **Command and Control Structures** We believe Africans themselves, in cooperation with the United States, other donors, sub-regional organizations, the OAU and the UN, will want to develop standby command structures which enable them to field the requisite peacekeeping units rapidly and effectively. Key to this command and control capability is leadership and staff training. Some African countries have Command and Staff Colleges capable of addressing these issues. Britain, Ireland, Canada, and the Nordic countries are also committed to staff training in an international context. We--as well as other donors--can also encourage more emphasis on logistics management, identified by several African leaders as the most crucial missing component in Africa for peacekeeping. ACRI initial and sustainment training develops the basic command and control staff skills required to work at a higher level. EUCOM, in conjunction with the ACRI TF and CENTCOM, begins the logical C2 training progression from battalion to brigade staff. An Ethiopian Brigade Headquarters will be the first trained sometime this calendar year. Recruiting for an African nation with brigade capability in our AOR is on going. POI development for brigade training is being worked by the ACRI TF and CENTCOM. Development of Brigade HQ staff capabilities will allow for easier transition to CJTF staff capability.

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1. **Long Term Strategy** The development by US Special Forces of 8-10 interoperable African battalions would be satisfactory. Training 10-12 interoperable African battalions and 4-6 specialized companies would be ideal. This work should be supplemented, in very important ways, by the work of other nations. Management of funds to provide initial training for new units, while funding sustainment and joint training exercises for previously-trained units, that need continued exposure to peacekeeping methodology, is critical. Such follow-on training is crucial to maintaining a high degree of proficiency. The opportunity for very real economies by combining resources for exercises with Britain, France and other countries must be explored. Further, recognition that the U.S. is unable to develop on a bilateral basis all the skills necessary for well-rounded peacekeeping forces requires increased coordination on a multi-lateral basis. As other donors step forward to provide training and equipment for units specializing in civilian police, peacekeeping, medical operations, and other skills the overall goal of enhancing African PKO/HUMRO capabilities will be achieved.

m. **Measures of Effectiveness** Can the unit effectively operate as part of a PKO/HUMRO mission? The critical elements of measures of effectiveness are the ability of the country trained to maintain the equipment provided and sustain training proficiency against established standards in critical collective and leader task. Personnel strength measured against required strength is important but ensuring the exact same 800 soldiers is not a true indicator of the units ability to accomplish the mission. If “train the trainer” concept is successful, the country should be able to integrate new soldiers into ACRI units and bring them up to required skill proficiency. ACRI contributes to EUCOM SSA measures of effectiveness by promoting the capability of the HN to respond to a regional exercise, increasing the professionalism of the HN military and contributing to regional stability.

3. **WAY AHEAD:**

a. **-Sustainment:** Sustainment of initial training and verification/validation of standards of both equipment and training was revised to provide a more robust program that is focuses on logistics and staff training. Sustainment events should incrementally increase proficiency of ACRI units.

b. **Self Sufficiency:** The “train the trainer” concept is critical to creating a capacity that can grow with minimal resources. As we improve the capabilities of NCOs and officers to conduct training at battalion level and below, the African militaries can start training additional battalions in peacekeeping fundamentals. Training resources may be a problem for poorer countries.

c. **ACRI training below Bn:** We also need to explore and then start training units below battalion level. As momentum builds for ACRI a lot of countries are starting to ask what role they can play. It makes sense that smaller countries could develop an ACRI niche such as

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demining or engineer that enhances the overall peacekeeping capacity. P3 or other countries could help in training some of these niche skills.

d. **Brigade Training:** The logical progression for ACRI training is to move from enhancing battalion capabilities to developing brigade staff capabilities to command and control the battalions and separate companies trained under ACRI. The building block approach of developing battalion C2 capabilities and then brigade C2 capabilities allows for future development of CJTF capabilities and structures. ACRI initial and sustainment training develops the basic command and control staff skills required to work at a higher level. EUCOM, in conjunction with the ACRI TF and CENTCOM, must now start the logical C2 training progression from battalion to brigade staff. An Ethiopian Brigade Headquarters will be the first trained sometime this calendar year. Recruiting for an African nation with brigade capability in our AOR is on going. POI development for brigade training is being worked by the ACRI TF and CENTCOM. Development of Brigade HQ staff capabilities will allow for easier transition to CJTF staff capability.

e. **Regional exercises:** We are working within the P3 to develop a regional exercise plan that involves a three phase program consisting of a seminar, CPX and then a multi-national PKO exercise. Each year one of the three events is conducted in one of the sub-regions sponsored by an African country or Sub-regional organization with support from a P3 sponsor.

f. **Multi-Lateral:** We must continue to work with Africans, Non-Africans and NGO/PVOs in a cooperative approach to enhancing PKO capabilities in Africa. Economies of scale can be achieved by pooling expertise and resources. The collective knowledge of all concerned is needed to push ACRI and other programs forward.

g. **ACRI C2/linkage with OAU/Sub-regional organization:** Command and control is another challenge that still needs to be addressed. We are working with the OAU CMC and hope to someday be able to link a regional exercise with a CMX but the OAU CMC has a long way to go.

h. **Interagency.** Refine pol-mil sustainment plan for the ACRI concept. Plan and program the ACRI's FY98 budget. Develop and coordinate plan for next group of countries to participate in ACRI. Continue purchase and delivery of equipment required to support initial ACRI training. Continue pursuing substantial international. UN and OAU support for both the ACRI concept and multi-lateral cooperation in Africa.

i. **USEUCOM.** Update concept plan to provide detailed military support for continued ACRI development and sustainment of training completed. As training equipment is provided, continue initial ACRI training (individual and leader through battalion levels) events in Mali (Feb 98), Ghana (Apr 98), Ethiopia battalion (Apr. 98), and a 2nd Ethiopia battalion and Bde HQ(TBD). Coordinate further military development by following up on recommendations provided during the ACRI AAR Workshop, (Sept.). Conduct pilot team assessment of next series

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of ACRI countries. Coordinate both ACRI and USEUCOM peacetime engagement activities with European Allies and NGOs/PVOs. Integrate ACRI trained African instructors into the training program to facilitate African involvement and ownership of the ACRI concept. USEUCOM's focus is training a competent force and developing the command and control HQ's necessary to lead that force.

4. **CONCLUSION**. The enhancement of existing African peacekeeping capabilities provides an additional option for action in the event of a peacekeeping mission or major humanitarian catastrophe in Africa. Working with Non-Africans, Africans and NGOs/PVOs; EUCOM is able to maximize resources to improve African PKO and HUMRO capabilities. ACRI is our most extensive peacetime engagement activity in SSA. It is a key tool is **shaping** the African environment by promoting professional apolitical militaries, respect for human rights, and the role of a military in a democracy. It **prepares**, both African and U.S. soldiers, for possible operations in Africa and it provides knowledge and relationships that will enable us to **respond** to crisis and humanitarian situations in Africa. We do not expect that the ACRI or any combination of international training initiatives will address the full range of problems subsumed under African conflict management. In fact, peacekeeping/humanitarian crisis intervention is just one aspect of a larger continuum involving conflict identification, mediation, diplomacy, peacebuilding, reconciliation and reconstruction. But, peacekeeping is an important element in this continuum, one that requires resources and expertise. While the United States will remain committed to supporting economic and democratic development in Africa, it must also lend its weight in support of African peacekeepers. When one examines the human and financial cost of continued instability and violence on the African continent--to Africa and the international community--it becomes clear that the development of interoperable, rapidly-deployable African peacekeeping capacity is in everyone's interest-